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ABSTRACT
This paper seeks to engagewith the ideas expressed by Professor Brazier in
her commentaryon theCharlotteWyatt case and todevelop contemporary
analysis around parental rights, notions of best interests, and shared deci-
sion-making between parents and professionals. The article begins by
setting the scene in relation to parental/professional conflict and frames
the discussion in the context of medical decision-making. Parental rights
are then explored before the analysis progresses to how the concept of
best interests has recently developed. Finally, the article investigates the
benefits of compromise, cooperation, and shared decision-making as the
most effective method for resolving disputes concerning children.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Conflict between parents and healthcare professionals is not an infrequent
occurrence.1 In a medical context, the potential for dispute between clini-
cians and parents over treatment for children is both apparent and real,
arising whenever questions are raised about the welfare of a child and
what may or may not be in that child’s best interests.2 The majority of
∗ Thanks are due to my colleague Dr Brigitte Clark and Dr Kevin Williams for
their useful comments on an earlier draft of this paper. Thanks are also due to
the journal’s anonymous referees for their helpful suggestions.
1 See JB Moore and MF Kordick, ‘Sources of Conflict Between Families and
Health Care Professionals’ (2006) 23 Journal of Paediatric Oncology
Nursing 82.
2 Re B (A Minor) [1981] 1 WLR 1421.
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the timeparents andprofessionals agree about thebest course of action, but
sometimes they do not. If no agreement can be reached, the courts will be
asked to settle the dispute. Interesting questions then surface about how the
courts should make their decision and what factors should be taken into
account when determining what is in a child’s best interests.
This paper seeks to engage with the ideas expressed by Professor
Brazier in her commentary on the Charlotte Wyatt case, in which she
developed analysis around parental rights, notions of best interests,
and shared-decision making between parents and professionals.3 The
article begins by setting the scene in relation to parental/professional
conflict and frames the discussion in the context of medical decision-
making. Parental rights are then explored before the analysis progresses
to how the concept of best interests has recently developed. Finally, the
article investigates the benefits of compromise, cooperation, and
shared-decision making as the most effective method for resolving dis-
putes concerning children.
II. PARENTAL/PROFESSIONAL CONFLICT
Medical disputes between parents and doctors are regularly brought
into the public eye, mainly because they often concern matters of life
and death; medical professionals wishing to take steps which would ef-
fectively end a child’s life where the parents feel that more of an effort
should be made to sustain that life and, vice versa, parents wishing to
refuse treatment that may result in a child’s life expectancy being dimin-
ished where the doctors feel there is a reasonable chance that it could be
extended. The first of these scenarios is especially difficult to deal with
and raises issues different from the second. It involves parents insisting
that doctors act contrary to their professional judgement, something
which the law has said quite firmly they may not do.4 Yet, judicial
endorsement of professional judgement is perhaps not that clear-cut.
It was said by Lord Woolf MR in R v Portsmouth Hospitals NHS
Trust, ex parte Glass that the refusal of the courts to dictate appropriate
treatment to a medical practitioner is subject to the power which courts
always have to take decisions in relation to a child’s best interests.5 It
could be that the courts may decide to opt for a second opinion or
perhaps even order the transfer of care. Either way, what is clear is
3 M Brazier, ‘An Intractable Dispute: When Parents and Professionals Disagree’
(2005) 13 Med L Rev 412.
4 A doctor cannot be compelled to provide treatment that he believes is not in a
patient’s best interests. R (on the application of Burke) v GMC [2005] EWCA
Civ 1003 at [31], [50–52].
5 [1999] 3 FCR 145, CA at 148.
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that the courts will not order an unwilling doctor to perform treatment
against her wishes, which is a major obstacle for parents. Equally, where
parents are demanding treatment, the often unspoken issue of resource
allocation needs to be considered. Where there is convincing evidence
that a child will not only fail to get better, but also that the treatment
being provided is conferring no benefit, then no matter how disturbing
it may seem there is at least an argument that the resources being used to
sustain a life in this state could be better utilised elsewhere, in patients
where there is a realistic chance of improvement. Judges and scholars
alike tread carefully around this issue, but it is undoubtedly considered,
even if not overtly, by the courts in their decision-making process.6
Finally, in cases where parents are attempting to compel doctors to ad-
minister treatment, quality of life arguments are more likely to be raised.
These are never easily resolved. Coverage at the time of the cases of the
conjoined twins Mary and Jodie,7 Charlotte Wyatt,8 Hannah Jones,9
and Baby OT10 illustrates that once cases such as these enter the head-
lines, public support is gathered for the plight of the parents, but seldom
are facts reported in their entirety and very little consideration is given to
the difficult position that health care professionals find themselves in
and also the problems faced by the courts.11
Confronted with opposing views from both parties to the dispute, the
court must engage in a delicate balancing act, weighing the respective
strengths and weaknesses of the conflicting opinions to reach its own
conclusion as to the best way to promote the welfare of the child.
Judges in England have usually favoured an interventionist approach
in circumstances where parents have refused treatment that is deemed
necessary to save the life of a minor. To this end, erring on the side of
preservation of life, certainly where children are involved, is justified.12
6 See A Pedain, ‘Doctors, Parents, and the Courts: Legitimising Restrictions on
the Continued Provision of Lifespan Maximising Treatment for Severely
Handicapped, Non-Dying Babies’ (2005) CFLQ 535.
7 Re A (Children) (Conjoined Twins: Surgical Separation) [2001] Fam 147.
8 Re Wyatt (A Child) (Medical Treatment: Parent’s Consent) [2004] EWHC
2247; [2005] All ER (D) 294; [2005] EWHC 693 (Fam).
9 See R Heywood, ‘The Right of Terminally Ill Teenagers to Make End-of-Life
Decisions’ (2009) 77 Medico-Legal Journal 30.
10 Re OT [2009] EWHC 633 (Fam); [2009] EWCA Civ 409.
11 The GMC advises clinicians ‘complex and emotionally demanding decisions
may have to be made’ and that ‘it can be very difficult to judge when the
burdens and risks, including the degree of suffering caused by treatment, out-
weigh the benefits of the treatment to the patient’. See GMC, ‘Treatment and
Care Towards the End of Life: Good Practice in Decision-Making’ (2010) at
45–47.
12 See Re S (A Minor) (Medical Treatment) [1993] 1 FLR 377; Re O (A Minor)
(Medical Treatment) [1993] 2 FLR 149; Camden LBC v R (A Minor) (Blood
Transfusion) [1993] 2 FLR 757.
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Nonetheless, this is not the only consideration. There is also the ques-
tion of quality of life, which to some is equally, if not more, important.
An added layer of complexity is immediately added to the courts’ job as
it is sometimes difficult to draw a finite line between preservation and
quality. In some cases, it will be relatively easy for the courts to identify
the two arguments as being distinct. For example, in the case of Re T, in
which the parents of a young boy refused to consent to a liver transplant
on his behalf, it was clear that the main concern of his parents was with
his quality of life. The court accepted this argument and in doing so
recognised that even if preservation of life was perceived to be the dom-
inating principle, pain and discomfort may be caused to the child in the
future which would not be in his best interests.13 This case represents a
rare example of the courts siding with parents over medical profes-
sionals, but this may have had more to do with its particular facts
than anything else. T’s parents were both health care professionals
who were experienced in caring for sick children, and the child had
also undergone earlier unsuccessful surgery which had caused him
pain and distress. Also, pragmatically, at the time of the hearing, the
family had moved to another country and so not only would the court
have had to grant an order authorising the transplant, it would also
have had to grant an order requiring the family to return to England
in order for the operation to go ahead. In other cases, however, the os-
tensibly competing positions of quality versus preservation will not be as
clear-cut; there may sometimes be an overlap when attempting to recon-
cile the opposing arguments. Thus, in Re A,14 the parents tried to argue
that the quality of Jodie’s life would be compromised if the separation
was allowed to go ahead; the operation would render her disabled, in
pain, unable to walk, and possibly incontinent. The Court of Appeal dis-
agreed and said that Jodie had a reasonable prospect of a decent quality
of life and therefore took the view that allowing the separation to go
ahead was lawful as it was in her best interests.15 In adopting this line
of reasoning, the Court of Appeal’s initial focus on quality of life led
to the conclusion that preservation of life was necessary.
It is clear that the courts are faced with a difficult task. When a
dispute over a child’s medical care reaches them, they have to examine
with great care and sensitivity the arguments from both sides, for if
they are too quick to displace parental views with those of their own,
or of the medical professionals, any belief that the law provides
13 Re T (A Minor) (Wardship: Medical Treatment) [1997] 1 WLR 242. See A
Bainham, ‘Do Babies Have Rights?’ (1997) 56 CLJ 48.
14 Re A, above, n 7.
15 Re A, above, n 7, at 182–3.
32 MEDICAL LAW REVIEW [2012]
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adequate protection for parental rights to make decisions about their
children’s healthcare becomes instantly questionable.
III. CIRCUMVENTING PARENTAL RIGHTS
Parents are under a duty in law to provide proper medical care for their
children.16 The corollary of this is that they have the right to consent to
certain forms of medical treatment on their children’s behalf. Yet, what
at first glimpse appears to be a wide-range of decision-making powers
bestowed upon parents by the law is, in fact, rather limited.17 Parents
can only consent to treatment that is in the best interests of their
child and may not ordinarily refuse treatment that may jeopardise
their child’s long-term welfare. So, when it comes to medical
decision-making, the law allows parents to make certain decisions, pro-
vided those decisions accord with the courts’ conception of best inter-
ests.18 If a decision does not meet with this approval, the courts will
step in and substitute their own judgment for that of the parent. In
this sense, a partial right is provided with a protective paternalistic
undercoat.19
It has been suggested that no one knows a child better than its
parents and, when viewed this way, the argument that it is they
who are best placed to make a decision about what is truly in their
child’s best interests is not implausible.20 Similarly, if the law is to
take seriously views about freedom of religion, expression, and the
right to respect for private and family life, it must attach genuine sig-
nificance to medical decisions which are underpinned by those values,
values which the English courts have only ever tipped their hats to in
the evolving case law.21 Despite this, judges have recognised that the
danger in characterising parental views as being sacrosanct is that
16 Children and Young Persons Act 1933, s 1 (1), s 1 (2) (a).
17 It is generally accepted in English law that parental rights exist only insofar as
they are necessary for the parent to fulfil their duty to care for the child. See
Gillick v West Norfolk and Wisbech Health Authority [1986] AC 112
at 184–5.
18 For discussion of the scope and limits of parental rights see A Bainham, Chil-
dren: The Modern Law (3rd edn Jordans, Bristol 2005); M Freeman, ‘The
Right to Responsible Parents’ in J Bridgeman, H Keating and C Lind (eds),
Responsibility, Law and the Family (Ashgate, London 2008).
19 For critique see A Bainham, ‘Is Anything Now Left of Parental Rights?’ in
R Probert, S Gilmore and J Herring (eds), Responsible Parents and Parental
Responsibility (Hart, Oxford 2009).
20 Hedley J acknowledged this in Re Wyatt (A Child) (Medical Treatment:
Parent’s Consent) [2004] EWHC 2247 at [34].
21 See, for example, the ease with which the courts overruled the refusal of
blood transfusions in the Jehovah’s Witnesses cases, above, n 12. See also
the cases cited below in n 41.
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those views may be projected onto their children at a point in their
lives when they are not in a position to make their own mind up
about what is best for them. It is important, then, for the law to
retain the power to override certain parental decisions where the
welfare of a child is compromised.22 The important point though,
is that intervention from the courts ought only to be regarded as
the exception rather than the rule, and there should be a genuine re-
luctance to interfere with the reasonably held views of the parents. To
this end, there are safeguards in place to limit the powers of the
court. Where a court is considering whether or not to make one or
more orders under the Children Act 1989 with respect to a child, it
cannot make the order or any of the orders unless it considers that
doing so would be better for the child than making no order at
all.23 Consequently, in practice, the majority of parental views
about medical treatment are actually respected and only on rare occa-
sions are they challenged and overturned. If, however, an exceptional
case does reach court, it becomes crucial, in order for the law to
maintain its integrity, that intervention is justified on the correct
basis—that of the best interests of the child. This strikes at the very
heart of the legal debate: the tension is not so much whether the
courts can override parental views, because it is clear they can, and
will; rather the key legal question focuses on what is meant by best
interests as a justification for agreeing with, or rejecting, the views
of parents or clinicians. Amid a difference of opinion between the
two, if the courts are too quick to view best interests from a
narrow medical perspective, it may give the impression that they
are doing nothing more than providing unquestioning support for
medical paternalism. It is this criticism that led Professor Brazier to
query whether best interests is little more than an ‘empty mantra’.24
IV. BEST INTERESTS: SOMETHING OLD, SOMETHING NEW
Traditionally, best interests was dictated by the medical profession. The
Bolam test, lifted from the law of negligence,25 was also used by the
courts to resolve disagreements about appropriate medical treatment
where adult patients were unable to consent or refuse for themselves;
22 It should be noted that it is the courts who have the authority to override deci-
sions of parents, not the doctors.Glass v United Kingdom (61827/00) [2004]
1 FLR 1019.
23 Children Act 1989, s 1 (5). Where proceedings are initiated outside the Chil-
dren Act 1989, for instance if the inherent jurisdiction of the court is invoked,
this does not apply.
24 Brazier, above, n 3 at 415.
25 Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee [1957] 1 WLR 582.
34 MEDICAL LAW REVIEW [2012]
 by guest on July 10, 2014
http://m
edlaw
.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
this effectively translated into something which said that if a responsible
body of medical opinion thought the treatment to be in the patient’s best
interests, the law would agree.26 Bolam’s wings have since been clipped
across a range of areas in medical law, and best interests has been taken
to mean something more than a simple medical assessment. Insofar as
children are concerned, a more holistic view of best interests was intro-
duced by the Children Act 1989, which includes a range of non-
exhaustive factors that must be taken into account when determining
the welfare of a child.27 The courts themselves have also recognised
that best interests is not one-dimensional and encompasses ‘medical,
emotional and all other welfare issues’.28 More recently, the legislature
has had the final word in respect of adults who lack capacity (and, where
relevant, young people over the age of sixteen). The Mental Capacity
Act 2005 now sets out a range of factors which must be considered
by the decision maker when assessing best interests.29 These statutory
criteria in the Mental Capacity Act 2005, whilst not directly applicable
to children under the age of sixteen, may have some influence on how
the courts look at cases involving younger children.30 Yet, there is still
doubt about the extent to which the courts are truly prepared to look
26 F v West Berkshire Health Authority [1990] 1 AC 1.
27 Children Act 1989, s 1 (3). The court must consider (a) the ascertainable
wishes and feelings of the child concerned (considered in the light of his age
and understanding); (b) his physical, emotional, and educational needs; (c)
the likely effect on him of any change in his circumstances; (d) his age, sex,
background, and any characteristics of his which the court considers relevant;
(e) any harm which he has suffered or is at risk of suffering; (f ) how capable
each of his parents, and any other person in relation towhom the court consid-
ers the question to be relevant, is of meeting his needs; (g) the range of powers
available to the court under this Act in the proceedings in question. It should be
noted that this checklist is only mandatory in the circumstances set out in s 1
(4) of the Act. It is not mandatory where there is a specific issue for the court to
decide but which is not contested by the parents. Furthermore, the checklist is
not mandatory where the inherent jurisdiction is invoked. For critique of this
welfare test, seeMWoolf, ‘Coming of Age? – The Principle of ‘The Best Inter-
ests of the Child’ (2003) 2 EHRLR 205.
28 Re A (Mental Patient: Sterilisation) [2000] 1 FLR 549 at 555.
29 Mental Capacity Act 2005. S 4 (4) states that the decision maker must permit
and encourage participation in the decision-making process. S 4 (6) places an
obligation on the decision maker to consider, so far is as reasonably ascertain-
able, (a) the person’s past and present wishes and feelings, (b) the beliefs and
values that would be likely to influence the decision if the person had capacity,
and (c) the other factors that the person would be likely to consider if he were
able to do so. S 4 (7) (c) also states that the views of anyone engaged in caring
for the person or interested in his welfare must be taken into account. For dis-
cussion, see M Donnelly, ‘Best Interests, Patient Participation and the Mental
Capacity Act 2005′ (2009) 17 Med L Rev 1.
30 Precisely how much influence the Mental Capacity Act 2005 will have on the
courts when it comes to cases involving children is unclear. However, it is ar-
guable how relevant the factors are to a child who has never had capacity and
is incapable of expressing a view.
Med. L. Rev. Parents and Medical Professionals 35
 by guest on July 10, 2014
http://m
edlaw
.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
beyond the medical evidence in assessing best interests. Returning to the
conjoined twins, the legitimate reservations held by the parents about
whether the proposed separation was in fact in Jodie’s best interests
were perhaps not given the attention they deserved.31 Are parents not
entitled to be concerned about agreeing to a medical procedure which
may cause their child to become incontinent, possibly condemn them
to an existence dependent upon medical care and potentially leave
them psychologically damaged in the knowledge that their survival
caused the inevitable demise of their sibling? The exceptional circum-
stances of the case may have rendered these concerns ill-founded to
some, but they were not wholly unreasonable. The social and emotional
factors were of significance in the quality of life assessment, but the
courts allowed Jodie’s medical outlook to dominate their reasoning.
This poses the question: are the non-medical factors merely a smoke-
screen for what is fundamentally still a judgment grounded in medical
tenets?32
The attraction of best interests is that it is a flexible mechanism that
can be used by the courts in a variety of different ways to justify a deci-
sion. The courts enjoy a wide margin of appreciation where, on the one
hand, they can view the concept in a narrow sense to justify a particular
outcome and, on the other, they can view it from a much wider perspec-
tive in order to support a different result. This discretion is not necessar-
ily a bad thing, but it does make it difficult to predict which view will
prevail in a given case. A further criticism is that it sets the threshold
for intervention at too low a level, allowing the courts too much
freedom to circumvent parental opinion. For this reason, other tests
have been mooted, such as that of ‘intolerability’, which would give
greater credence to parents’ views with the courts only being allowed
to interject where the ‘parents’ wishes militate against the interests of
the child.’33 In Wyatt, if the intolerability approach had been used,
the courts would only have been allowed to override the parents’
wishes if their decision would have made continuing Charlotte’s exist-
ence intolerable. This is a different and higher threshold for legitimising
court action than currently operates under best interests, but it is not
without problems. The question that remains is what might intolerabil-
ity actually mean where the infant has little or no capacity to appreciate
the quality of its existence? The ability of a child to experience pain does
not, per se, equate to an ability to judge what is intolerable, because the
31 Re A, above, n 7 at 172.
32 For further discussion, see M Brazier and E Cave,Medicine, Patients and the
Law (Penguin, London 2011) at 428–34.
33 Brazier, above, n 3 at 415. The test of intolerability was raised in Wyatt,
above, n 8, and rejected.
36 MEDICAL LAW REVIEW [2012]
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ability to judge that demands a more extensive cognitive process and
increased level of awareness, enabling one to consider a range of differ-
ent factors. Intolerability, as both a concept and a legal test, is vague and
unpredictable and in light of the factors which need to be considered
under the Children Act 1989 (and the Mental Capacity Act 2005 if it
is to have any influence), it would seem that intolerability is merely
one aspect of a much broader assessment of a child’s welfare or best
interests.34
The courts have always made explicit reference to the balancing act
that must be performed when determining best interests.35 Hedley J,
in Wyatt, stressed that whilst there was a presumption in favour of pre-
serving life, this was not absolute and could be rebutted if there was suf-
ficient evidence to indicate that life-sustaining treatment would actually
work to the detriment of the child.36 A similar balancing exercise was
conducted with painstaking care by Parker J in the recent case of
Baby OT.37 Baby OT was diagnosed as suffering from a mitochondrial
condition of genetic origin within three weeks of being born. The con-
dition caused him to suffer severe and irreparable brain stem damage
which left him incapable of breathing unaided. His hospital carers
applied to the court for a declaration that it would be lawful to discon-
tinue ventilation as the nature of the life-sustaining treatment was in-
creasingly invasive, was causing him immense distress, and was not
going to make him better. Parker J acknowledged that the law
demanded of her a balancing exercise in which she set out clearly the
burdens of continuing the treatment. These included, inter alia, the irre-
versible nature of Baby OT’s brain damage and the negative effect that
this would have on his continued existence, the fact that the treatment
needed to sustain him was invasive, that Baby OT was clearly distressed
and felt pain as a result of his condition and continued treatment, that
his suffering outweighed his brief moments of pleasure, and, finally,
that he had lived all bar three weeks of his life in a paediatric intensive
care unit which was unnatural and which would continue in the
future.38 On the other side, Parker J took into account such things as
the love that Baby OT’s parent had for him, the likelihood that the
baby experienced some comfort from his parents and carers, signs of re-
sponse, emotion and happiness being sometimes displayed from the
child, and that he would continue to receive superb medical treatment
34 See above nn 27 and 29.
35 See Re J (A Minor) (Wardship: Medical Treatment) [1991] Fam. 33; Re A,
above n 28 at 560.
36 Re Wyatt (A Child) (Medical Treatment: Parent’s Consent) [2004] EWHC
2247 at [38]–[39].
37 Re OT, above, n 10.
38 Re OT [2009] EWHC 633 (Fam) at [110]–[135].
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which would extend his life, a life which was of incalculable value in
itself.39 After considering all of these points, she granted the declaration
sought from the hospital.40 This contemporary example of the process
which the courts go through makes one thing abundantly clear: no
matter how hard the courts try to give the impression that they are
willing to consider a wider range of social and emotional factors in
their best interests’ assessment, they find it incredibly difficult to distance
themselves from medical opinion. Furthermore, as meticulous as this
balancing act may have been, legitimate questions still exist about
what is truly meant when judges, doctors, or others talk about carefully
‘balancing’ the various factors that form part of the best interests assess-
ment. The reality is that many of the factors are actually impossible to
measure or compare. How can a child’s pain be weighed in the same
scale as their parents’ wishes? Specific factors also seem to be given pre-
cedence. Thus, despite it being a concept open to multiple interpreta-
tions, in cases such as Wyatt and Baby OT, futility may well have
been the true reasoning behind the courts’ decision in the sense that
the treatment would not have brought about any significant improve-
ment in the patient’s prospects or alleviate pain and discomfort. Some
may disagree that this should be treated as the overriding consideration
and there may be some merit in that argument, but the legal reality is
that it is happening, at least insofar as life and death cases are concerned.
That does not mean to say that it is only in life and death cases that best
interests raises difficult questions. On the contrary, disputes which do
not concern matters of life and death have challenged the courts and
it is arguably in these cases that we begin to see whether or not we
truly have moved away from a medical interpretation of best interests.41
Consider the example of a live organ transplant between siblings.42 It
is widely accepted that those responsible for overseeing transplants, as
well as those who actually perform the surgery, have effectively rejected
the possibility of such procedures involving minors as donors taking
place, at least insofar as non-regenerative tissue is concerned.43
39 Re OT, above, n 38 at [136]–[145].
40 Re OT, above, n 38 at [110]–[135].
41 See Re C (AChild) (Immunisation: Parental Rights) [2003] EWCACiv 1148;
Re J (A Minor) (Prohibited Steps Order: Circumcision) [2000] 1 FLR 571.
42 See for recent discussion B Lyons, ‘Obliging Children’ (2011) 19 Med L
Rev 55.
43 Principle 4 of The World Health Organisation’s Guiding Principles on
Human Organ Transplantation (1994) states that there ought to be a com-
plete ban on using minors as organ donors for non-regenerative tissue. Ac-
cordingly, many doctors would not even consider such a procedure. Yet, it
is clear that the Human Tissue Authority (HTA) does not completely envisage
non-regenerative transplants involving minors as being unlawful. Code 2 of
the HTA states that ‘children can be considered as living organ donors only
38 MEDICAL LAW REVIEW [2012]
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However, the following hypothetical scenario raises some interesting
points. Imagine identical same-sex twins who have just reached the
age of ten, one of whom has been diagnosed with a serious kidney con-
dition and placed on the transplant list, the other who possesses two
healthy kidneys. The latter child offers to be a live donor. For the pur-
poses of this example, let us say that the twins are found not to be
Gillick competent.44 Parent one agrees that the transplant should go
ahead, but parent two does not.45 As unlikely as it would be in practice,
both the doctors and the Human Tissue Authority support the view of
parent one and they are also satisfied that the proposed treatment has
not been a result of coercion and that no money has changed hands.46
Notwithstanding the green light from the professionals, the parental dis-
agreement causes the matter to be referred to court. How would the
courts approach the balancing exercise in this situation? Would we
see a more pragmatic assessment of best interests than we have seen
before in cases involving regenerative tissue, or would the courts
retreat to the safety of medical best interests?47 If they were to adopt
this approach, the balancing act would still not be easy. Medically,
there is no benefit whatsoever to the donor child; in actual fact, the
surgery would positively expose him to an increased risk of harm but,
on the other hand, the donee would receive the benefit of a new
kidney and therefore a much longer and healthier life. Medically, there-
fore, it is without doubt in the recipient’s best interests, but the same
cannot be said of the donor. It would be interesting to see which way
the courts would go here.
Clearly the scenario raises a number of interesting points about how a
court can apply a best interests test where two children are involved.48
Would both children be the subjects of the court application in the
in extremely rare circumstances’. This will only be authorised after relevant
parental consent has been obtained under the Human Tissue Act 2004, s 2
(3) and the case has been referred to, and approved by, an independent
HTA panel. Court approval must now also be obtained before the procedure
can go ahead (Code 2, para 47).
44 Gillick, above, n 17.
45 See above, n 43. Ordinarily consent would only be needed from one of the
parents for medical treatment to go ahead. Where there is a disagreement
between the two over a seriously invasive procedure, particularly where it
is of no medical benefit to the child such as this, it seems the case must be re-
ferred to the court. See Re J, above, n 35.
46 In all probability, the major obstacle in this scenario would be that the
doctors did not believe it to be in the donor twin’s best interests and no
one can require a doctor to provide treatment that he/or she does not feel
is warranted. See above nn 4 and 5.
47 In England, see Re Y (Mental Patient: Bone Marrow Donation) [1997] Fam
110; in America, see Strunk v Strunk 445 SW 2d 145 (Ky, 1969).
48 Some of these questions have been raised before and were starkly illustrated
in Jodie and Mary’s case. Re A, above, n 7.
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case, or just the donor? If it is the latter, it would surely have to be his
best interests that took precedence in deciding whether or not to author-
ise the procedure. If, however, both children were the subjects of the ap-
plication, it would not be that straightforward. Either way, this author
tentatively suggests that the courts would be unlikely to authorise the
procedure and this is mainly because two sets of competing interests
are at stake. The court would have to resolve this by favouring one
over the other and it would seem that the mere potential for extending
and preserving one life does not outweigh the significant risk of harm
that would be caused to the other. That being said, a completely differ-
ent view may be taken which would certainly not be unreasonable.
‘Emotional’ and other ‘welfare’ issues may come to the fore, encompass-
ing such things as how the donor may be affected psychologically if his
brother dies as a result of him not being allowed to donate, how it may
alter the relationship between him and his parents in the future and how,
if indeed at all, the procedure will impact upon his current and future
health, lifestyle and career. These considerations bear a striking resem-
blance to those which formed an integral part of the court’s pragmatic
assessment of best interests in Re Y in which a bone marrow transplant
was allowed to go ahead where the donor was a suitable match.49 Thus,
despite a clear reticence from the courts to place great weight on ‘wider’
considerations, it is evident that they can, and will, if they feel it is war-
ranted in the given circumstances of a particular case.
There is also a further dimension to best interests which needs consid-
ering; the views of the child must be taken into account. This is easier
said than done. Disputes will not always involve infants too young to
have any (even imputed) views of their own. The courts may be faced
with a slightly older, albeit not Gillick competent, child. The exact
weight that the courts place on these views will understandably fluctuate
and there may be a justifiable reluctance on the part of a judge to attach
any great significance to the views of an older child who is found not to
be able to sufficiently appreciate the nature and consequences of his or
her actions. But regardless of that, it seems clear that both the past and
present wishes of a child should be of some relevance.50 This ought to be
49 Re Y, above, n 47. Here the courts sanctioned a bone marrow donation from
a mentally incapacitated adult patient to her elder sister. The courts con-
cluded that the transplant was in the mentally ill sister’s best interests
because if her other sister died, this would have a profound effect on her
mother who would no longer be able to devote the same amount of care
and attention to her in the future. This case needs to be treated with
caution though. It was stressed that its value as a precedent was limited
and that the outcome may not have been the same had the case involved
more intrusive surgery. See D Feenan, ‘A Good Harvest’ (1997) 9 CFLQ 305.
50 See above, n 27.
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particularly relevant in cases which do not involve matters of life and
death and so, in the organ transplant scenario above, based on the
factors listed in the Children Act 1989, the views of both children
should be subject to careful scrutiny. If they were both in support of
the procedure going ahead, that should be an important factor in
favour of the courts authorising the operation. If one objects, that
should also be significant. It is trite that children’s views should not
be determinative, but they must be heard, and be seen to be heard, in
the decision-making process.51
Best interests will no doubt continue to evolve by building on the
existing principles in domestic legislation and case law. It may well be
that in the future parental perspective is given more weight, and certain-
ly in some cases that would be desirable. On the other hand, the courts
may adopt a more flexible approach to best interest, recognising that
there are no hard and fast rules for determining where a child’s best
interests lie. One consequence of this, as noted previously, is unpredict-
ability. This has implications for medical practitioners who, in their
treatment decisions, will be left to second guess in which cases the
courts will place greater emphasis on wider social and quality factors
at the expense of medical considerations. This could be something
that the courts are anxious to avoid and, as such, maintaining a prefer-
ence for medical best interests, from a practical standpoint if nothing
else, may be the preferable course of action.
V. PARENTS AND PROFESSIONALS: A RELATIONSHIP
OF MUTUAL COOPERATION
There will always be rare and exceptional cases which undoubtedly call
for court involvement because the dispute cannot be settled in any other
way, Re A being a classic example.52 But the issues will not always be
that stark and, with this in mind, it is important that, wherever possible,
parents and medical professionals are encouraged to work together to
sort out any differences before resorting to the law. Indeed, Brazier
emphasises the importance of partnership of care between parents and
professionals. Yet, she warns that where that partnership fails, it may
well be that there is no alternative way to resolve a dispute other than
in the formal setting of a court.53 Thus, it is crucial that partnership
of care is allowed to flourish in clinical practice.
51 SeeMDonnelly and U Kilkelly, ‘Child-Friendly Healthcare: Delivering on the
Right to be Heard’ (2011) 19 Med L Rev 27.
52 Re A, above, n 7 at 171.
53 Brazier, above, n 3, at 418.
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In contemporary medicine, more and more emphasis is being placed
on shared-decision making and partnership care. It is no longer accept-
able for doctors to make decisions for patients without any consultation
as to the available options and the risks and benefits attendant upon
each. This practice naturally extends to involving parents in treatment
decisions about their children. If there is a difference of opinion
between doctors and parents, the majority of the time, as is the case
in everyday life, a favourable solution can be reached by compromise
and reason. If parents are shown respect, they will give respect and,
more often than not, no matter how heart-wrenching the decision
may be, will be prepared to listen to what the medical professionals
have to say about the effectiveness of the various treatment options
for their child.54
This relationship of mutual trust and respect develops from honesty,
transparency and good communication. If utilised correctly, these can
be effective tools for reaching a desirable outcome in a range of cases
that involve not only those disputes which concern younger children,
but also older ones. Take, for example, the recent case of Hannah
Jones.55 Hannah was thirteen years old and said to be Gillick compe-
tent. She suffered from a critical heart condition and healthcare profes-
sionals initially proposed a heart transplant on the basis that it was in
her best interests. Hannah refused. Rather than supporting the
medical professionals, her parents took the unusual step of agreeing
with her. This caused the medical professionals to consider invoking
care proceedings, plans which they eventually abandoned. Had the
medical professionals maintained an intransigent stance, and had
Hannah been taken into care, it seems highly probable that the local au-
thority could have applied to the court to exercise its inherent jurisdic-
tion and authorise the transplant against Hannah’s wishes.56 The
medical team opted to abandon this course of action, instead deciding
to respect the wishes of Hannah and her parents. Did the medical pro-
fessionals’ pacifying approach lead to the tragic outcome which many
anticipated? No—it was reported later in the year that Hannah had
eventually changed her mind and agreed to be placed on the transplant
54 For discussion, see GMC, ‘0–18 Years: Guidance for All Doctors’ (2007) at
[1]–[21].
55 See Heywood, above, n 9.
56 See Re M (A Child) (Refusal of Medical Treatment) [1999] 2 FLR 1097.
Whilst the procedure was authorised in Re M against the child’s wishes, it
is difficult to say with certainty that the same would have happened if the
Hannah Jones case had made it as far as court. M was an emergency case
with no history of the condition, whereas Hannah had been receiving care
for her condition for some time. Equally, her objections were based not on
religious beliefs, but on a quality of life assessment, so it may have been
that her views were taken more seriously.
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list.57 Of course, it could have gone differently, and there is always a
problem with the benefit of hindsight, but nonetheless there is still a
lesson to be learned here; recourse to formal legal proceedings can some-
times be counterproductive. Asking the court to authorise treatment
against the wishes of Hannah and her parents would only have
created further tension in a situation that was already delicately
poised. Rather than alienating the patient and her family, in opting to
respect their perceptions about important quality of life arguments,
the professionals would have instilled a greater feeling of trust and con-
fidence between the parties. This is not to suggest that the medical pro-
fessionals cannot work together with parents and children to gently
persuade them that their advice is sensible, but it is clear that this is
much more about shared-decision making than usurping. Persuasion
was probably a tactic employed with great effect in Hannah’s case
because of the cooperation between carers and parents, but this might
not necessarily have been the case had the original confrontational
stance been sustained.
Resolving disputes requires that parents are heard and so too the care
team. This is not just the immediate surgeons or physicians, but also the
wider team, including the nursing staff and other carers, who spend con-
siderable time with sick children. It is these people who often develop a
rapport with infants and begin to get a feel for any pain and suffering
that they may be going through and indeed any sense of enjoyment
they get out of life.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
The potential for disagreement between parents and medical profes-
sionals when it comes to healthcare decisions about children has been
a perennial problem in the evolution of medico-legal jurisprudence
and, given that there will always be grounds to question what is in a
child’s best interests, this threat continues to exist. Where parents see
treatment being withheld from their sick child which in their eyes is
necessary to save its life, they will understandably voice concern;
conversely, where medical professionals think they can offer treatment
that will save and prolong life, they are unlikely to allow parental objec-
tions to go unchallenged. However, court proceedings are unpleasant
and financially and emotionally costly, so recourse to the law should
be the last resort and reserved for the most serious of cases where the
dispute is patently intractable.
57 M Weaver, ‘Right-to-Die Teenager Hannah Jones Changes Mind About
Heart Transplant’ The Guardian (21 July 2009).
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Even though compromise is the best way to resolve disputes, some-
times it will not be possible and judicial input will be required. When
this happens, perhaps one should not be too critical of any decision
taken by the courts and recognise that they are faced with a thankless
task of having to adjudicate in a forum which requires a more pragmatic
than academic perspective. They can weigh up the advantages and dis-
advantages of each possible course of action, but in the end they have to
make a decision. The best interests test is a flexible mechanism that has
allowed them to do this, although it does not follow that the courts are
immune from criticism for the manner in which they have approached
the balancing exercise in the past. It is clear that, in the majority of
cases, medical factors have taken precedence and the likelihood is that
they will continue to do so. It may be that this approach is the most prag-
matic, but that does not necessarily mean it is correct or, moreover, that
it will be viewed as being correct in everyone’s eyes. In certain situations,
the courts may place the emphasis incorrectly which, in some instances,
will leave parents feeling aggrieved and medical professionals in others.
For this reason, Brazier’s conclusion that there is ‘no right answer’ to the
dilemmas posed in cases where there is a dispute between parents and
medical professionals about what is in a child’s best interests is wholly
accurate.58 It is a matter of conjecture as to which direction the courts
will head in the future, but it is essential that if they are unconvinced
by wider social, emotional and quality of life considerations, they
ensure that their approach to best interests can withstand careful scru-
tiny and remains justifiable.
58 Brazier, above, n 3, at 418.
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